The History of the Civil War in Kentucky: Chapter 6 — The Confederate Invasion of Kentucky

November 2, 2024

“The Civil War in Kentucky” is a 10-part series recently published in my Journey Log entitled “Surrounding Fort Knox, including Southern Indiana.” It deals primarily with the Central Kentucky Theater. I present it here as a series of individual blogs for my readers. Links to the previously published chapters will be provided at the end of each blog. Look for them on each Saturday morning! (A link to the book and its Table of Contents is found here.)

A number of questions about that invasion perplex those not steeped in military experience. And even those experts are uncertain, even after a detailed analysis. After capturing Munfordville on the Green River of Kentucky, where both the L & N Railroad and the Louisville and Nashville Turnpike crossed the river, why didn’t Confederate General Braxton Bragg turn south and fight Union General Don Carlos Buell’s Army which was chasing after him? And why, with his Army still moving northward, did Bragg not strike directly at Louisville before Buell and his reinforcements could reach the city? Why did he allow Buell’s Army to “sneak” around him and reach Louisville first?

Here are some factors to consider. The South had hoped that the presence of a Confederate Army in Kentucky would draw in a trove of recruits to swell its forces. That didn’t happen. Though divided, with many family members fighting on opposite sides of the conflict, the sentiment of overwhelming support for the Southern cause just wasn’t there.

Perhaps Bragg was concerned that his Army would become trapped in Louisville. The North controlled the Ohio River and Union reinforcements were pouring in. Buell’s Army was at his rear. Maybe Bragg was just on a giant foraging expedition in Kentucky for supplies and men?

Then there was the matter of a second invading Confederate Army, one led by General Kirby Smith from the east. It had swept around the Cumberland Gap and taken Richmond, Lexington, and even the State Capitol at Frankfort. Bragg’s logic seemed to involve joining up with Kirby Smith’s Army before bringing on a major battle with Buell. One problem with that strategy was that General Kirby Smith had an independent command not directly subject to Bragg’s orders.

Or maybe Bragg’s reticence was due to the shockingly lethal lessons learned in the Battle of Pittsburg Landing [Shiloh]. That the depravation, death, and disease experienced in that battle would surely require more planning before engaging in again.

And thus, the Civil War came to maneuver over the Kentucky landforms described in this textbook. Bragg would pivot his Army at Nolin and head east to link up with that of Kirby, moving through Hodgenville near Lincoln’s birthplace, and down Muldraugh Hill directly past Lincoln’s old boyhood home. I wonder if the Confederate soldiers were told of President Lincoln’s youthful presence there?

The difficult decisions necessary to move tens of thousands of men around, to effectively confront an enemy of similar size in a “decisive battle,” are daunting. And the logistical support required for such movement, often in hostile enemy territory, is almost overwhelming. Much of the genius of war is found in those in support, not necessarily in the brave leaders charging forward at the head of their Army.

The question about Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s failure to turn and engage the Union Army of General Don Carlos Buell at Munfordville, involves such considerations. We have an insightful discussion of Bragg’s decisions by one directly involved in his invasion of Kentucky. Cavalryman Basil Duke, John Hunt Morgan’s most trusted subordinate.

Raised in Lexington, Kentucky, across the street from the home of John Hunt Morgan, Duke was only 25 when he joined Morgan’s cavalry as First Lieutenant in 1861. He would marry Morgan’s younger sister, Henrietta, in that same year. Duke would survive the war [Morgan did not] and become a successful lawyer in Louisville, promoting the “Lost Cause” vision of the Confederacy. He even came to represent the L & N Railroad, the target of so much destruction by Morgan and his men. It was Duke, then a General, that led Confederate President Jefferson Davis’ retreat from Richmond with the Confederate treasury. Duke died in 1916 at the age of 78, having written numerous treatises [see the Selected Resources Section of this book] and becoming one of the founders of the Filson Historical Society in Louisville.

Basil Duke, in his “Reminiscences” [pages 297 through 319], reflected at length about Bragg’s decision not to turn and fight Buell. Although generally a supporter of Bragg, his analysis is unflattering. He said the following about Bragg:

“Almost unriveled [sic] as a subordinate and Lieutenant, [Bragg] could never become a great General. He was lacking in the quick, fertile, and accurate conception and broad comprehension which make the successful strategist; he was not an able taction.” [Page 298]

“… A campaign based upon one of the grandest strategic conceptions of the War [invasion of Kentucky], but doomed to disappointment and failure because of the timidity and vacillation with which … it was conducted.” [Page 299]

Duke goes on to quote Bragg’s explanation for the decision not to fight in Munfordville and instead turn toward Bardstown through Hodgenville.

“He [Bragg] says: ‘Reduced at the end of fourteen days to three days rations, and in a hostile country, utterly destitute of supplies, a serious engagement brought on anywhere in that direction could not fail … to materially cripple me … I was well aware also that he [Buell] had a practical route by way of Morgantown or Brownsville to the Ohio River and thence to Louisville.’”

Buell did, in fact, use the western route to move his supply trains north, but he was not about to give up the chase. So he moved the main body of his fighting force directly forward, toward Bragg’s Army along the Louisville and Nashville Turnpike. And when Buell’s troops reached West Point, they, too, were out of rations. But at West Point, they were resupplied with provisions brought by steamboats down from Louisville. So Bragg’s concern about support for his own Army was appropriate.

On September 20, 1862, Bragg moved his troops north to Nolin and east to Hodgenville, down Muldraugh Hill to New Haven, and then on to Bardstown.

This story now returns to the importance of West Point, for the massive Union Army of Don Carlos Buell had “slipped” past Braxton Bragg. It would reach Louisville by marching down Muldraugh Hill on the old Louisville and Nashville Turnpike and right through the river town of West Point.

You can march with them again now. Just go to the “Bridges to the Past Park,” which preserves much of the turnpike up Muldraugh Hill! [You can see my video of the Park by searching “Bridges to the Past” on http://www.vanstockum.blog.]

The great mass of Buell’s soldiers marched down that hill, first reaching West Point on September 25, 1862. As many as 40,000 Union soldiers would take eight days coming down off that mountain, reaching West Point and concentrating there. Buell’s 17-mile wagon train, with more than 1,700 wagons, arrived in West Point on October 3, 1862.

One million military rations of food were waiting for them at West Point, having been brought down from Louisville by six steamboats. Quite a different view of the importance, then, of what is now the quiet, pretty town of West Point, Kentucky!

Bragg’s concern about the difficulty in supplying a huge and hungry Confederate Army moving through enemy territory was reasonable. But was that a good reason to attack Louisville and capture the provisions that had accumulated there? Confederate General Braxton Bragg didn’t think so, so on to Perryville we will go!

Previous Chapters

Chapter 1: The History of the Civil War in Kentucky

Chapter 2: Surrounding Sherman and Grant

Chapter 3: William Tecumseh Sherman in Kentucky

Chapter 4: Civil War Camp Nevin and Nolin Station

Chapter 5: West Point, Sherman, and Fort Duffield

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